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Abstract 
 
Considerable research has documented the role of debt covenants and conservative 
financial accounting in addressing agency conflicts between lenders and borrowers. 
Beatty, Weber and Yu (BWY, 2008) document interesting, but mixed, findings on the 
relation between debt covenants and conservative accounting, and the extent to which the 
two contracting mechanisms act as substitutes or complements. In this paper, I discuss 
the economic roles of financial reporting, debt covenants, and conservatism within the 
debt contracting environment, and attempt to fit BWY’s findings within this context. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of debt covenants in resolving agency problems between firms and 
lenders has long been recognized and studied (e.g., Smith and Warner 1979). At the same 
time, the role of financial reporting conservatism in reducing agency costs associated 
with debt financing has also been recognized and studied, with evidence showing that 
observed conservatism in financial reports is associated with capital structure and the cost 
of debt. Connecting the two is the fact that a firm’s debt covenants are typically written 
over the firm’s financial accounting numbers. Thus, it is interesting to consider whether 
and to what extent, debt covenants adjust reported accounting numbers to achieve a 
desired level of overall conservatism in the contracting relationship. 
Beatty, Weber and Yu (BWY, 2008) examine the relation between conservatism 
in firms’ financial reports and conservative adjustments made to reported financial 
numbers used in debt covenants. If financial statement conservatism and conservative 
adjustments to debt covenants each serve a similar role in resolving agency problems, 
then the two types of conservatism should be substitutes. That is, firms that choose 
greater financial statement conservatism should require fewer conservative adjustments 
in debt covenants. Alternatively, if financial statement conservatism and conservative 
adjustments to debt covenants each have relative strengths and weaknesses in resolving 
agency problems in debt contracting, then the two types of conservatism may be 
positively related. That is, firms that require greater conservatism to resolve agency 
problems in their debt contracting relationships may make more conservative adjustments 
to both financial statements and debt covenants.     
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The authors examine two types of conservative adjustments to net worth 
covenants: income escalators and intangible asset exclusions. Income escalators reduce 
the slack in the net worth covenant that would otherwise be provided by positive 
cumulative income, but typically make no analogous adjustment when cumulative 
income is negative. The effect of the income escalator, therefore, is to allow slack to 
increase by only a fraction of cumulative profits, but to decrease dollar-for-dollar with 
cumulative losses. Intangible asset exclusions remove intangible assets from the net 
worth calculation. This exclusion places constraints on a firm’s ability to acquire 
intangible assets using tangible assets or equity (e.g., substituting tangible assets for 
intangible assets will reduce covenant slack, and acquiring intangible assets by issuing 
equity will not increase net worth or covenant slack). 
Using a sample of private debt agreements with net worth covenants, the authors 
find mixed results on the relation between covenant adjustments and financial reporting 
conservatism. Depending on the setting, the authors’ evidence suggests that covenant 
adjustments may be a substitute for financial reporting conservatism, a complement to 
financial reporting conservatism, or bear no relation with examined measures of financial 
reporting conservatism.  
My discussion proceeds in three steps. First, I discuss the economic role of debt 
covenants and financial reporting conservatism in controlling agency conflicts. Next, I 
discuss the economic role of income escalator and tangible net worth adjustments to debt 
covenants in controlling agency conflicts. Finally, I discuss BWY’s findings in the 
context of the economic roles of debt covenant adjustments and financial reporting 
conservatism. I conclude in the last section. 
2. Discussion of debt covenants and financial reporting conservatism in resolving 
agency conflicts 
Creditors lend capital to firms. After lending the capital, the primary concern of 
creditors is to ensure that their capital is eventually returned, with interest. If the creditors 
expected that the firm’s managers would act in the creditors’ best interests in all states of 
the world, there would be little reason to write complex debt contracts; that is, the 
creditors would need to do little monitoring because the firms’ managers would make 
their best attempt to ensure that the creditors receive their capital with interest.  
However, it is well-known that managers will not always act in the best interests 
of creditors. In particular, agency conflicts can exist between managers/shareholders and 
creditors that give rise to actions by firms that cause creditors some concern. These 
concerns are broadly categorized as actions by firms that increase the risk or probability 
that the creditors will not see their investment returned. Common examples include 
managers increasing firm leverage by making cash payouts to shareholders in the form of 
dividends or share repurchases, or increasing the riskiness of the firm’s assets through 
various investment decisions. In many cases, creditors will not be particularly concerned 
with day-to-day payout policies and investment decisions, as managers of financially 
healthy, going-concern firms are typically expected to maximize firm value (i.e., the total 
value of the claims of creditors and equity holders). However, it is well-known that in 
settings characterized by a substantial probability of distress, managers may make 
decisions that are advantageous to shareholders to the detriment of creditors. Debt 
contracting and debt covenants in particular, are primarily concerned with allocating 
decision rights to creditors in states of the world where managers cannot be trusted to 
maximize firm value.  
To effectively monitor their investments, creditors require: 1) information that 
allows them to determine when managers/shareholders might take actions that are not in 
creditors’ best interests, and; 2) the ability to have some decision rights over the firm 
when such circumstances arise. Financial reporting and debt covenants, the main topics in 
the BWY paper, each serve at least one of the above roles in assisting creditors in 
effectively monitoring their investments. In particular, financial reporting seems 
reasonably well-suited to providing creditors with reliable information about net assets, 
leverage, current-period performance, near-term cash flows, changes in asset 
mix/riskiness, etc. At the same time, debt covenants that constrain cash payouts and risk 
choices seem well-suited to providing creditors with decision rights when financial 
reporting information indicates that managers may take actions detrimental to creditors. It 
is possible that debt covenants could serve a dual role by also requiring firms to report 
financial measures that elicit additional information beyond that provided by GAAP 
financial statements and disclosures. However, such covenants are expected to be more 
costly to monitor since this supplemental accounting information would likely require 
additional auditing and processing.  
I now turn to the role of “conservatism” in the contracting relationship between 
firms and their creditors. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) note two important and distinct 
concepts of conservatism; the first being that conservative financial reporting imparts a 
downward bias on reported net worth so as to offset managers’ tendencies to bias net 
worth upwards, and the second being that conservative financial reporting commits 
managers to recognizing bad news in a timely manner.2 Basu (1997) and Ball and 
Shivakumar also note that the second of these two roles for conservatism is likely to be 
the most important, as contracting parties are expected to be able to readily contract 
around bias. Therefore, the bias role for conservatism is unlikely to improve contracting 
efficiency.  
In light of the monitoring issues described above, it is not difficult to see why 
creditors might find it helpful to have conservative reporting rules that elicit timely bad 
news. Creditors concerns about their investments are magnified when firms’ financial 
health deteriorates.3 Further, as noted by Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005), 
managers can have asymmetric incentives to be less forthcoming with bad news about 
firm performance vis-à-vis good news. Or, equivalently, managers are expected to be 
relatively more forthcoming with good news than bad news, irrespective of how 
mandated financial accounting rules are structured. Therefore, given that creditors are 
relatively more concerned about poor firm performance, and that managers are expected 
to be relatively less forthcoming about poor firm performance, creditors are expected to 
welcome/demand financial accounting reports that elicit from managers timely 
information about poor firm performance (see Guay and Verrecchia (2007) for a formal 
framework that motivates an informational role for conservative financial reporting).        
                                                 
2 It is also likely that, conditional on the formal requirements to recognize bad news in a timely manner, 
firms supplement their bad news recognition with more informal disclosures that better explain the bad 
news in their accounting reports (e.g., press releases, conference calls, discussion in the MD&A section of 
the Form 10-K, etc.). 
3 It should be emphasized that although creditors do not have symmetric claims on the firm’s cash flows, 
creditors still require timely information about gains to effectively monitor the firm. It is costly for 
bondholders to intervene in the decision-making of the firm; costly for both the bondholders and the firm. 
Therefore, because it is not efficient for bondholders to intervene too frequently, bondholders require 
timely information about gains that indicate the firm is sufficiently healthy that intervention is unnecessary.  
Although all public U.S. firms follow GAAP, this does not imply that all firms 
have or demand the same degree of conservatism in their financial reports. Accounting 
rules have evolved endogenously over time to meet the needs of various market 
participants and contracting parties. Therefore, one might reasonably assume that 
observed accounting rules conform to the weighted average demands of users of financial 
statements, where the weighting is based on the relative importance of certain types of 
contracting parties, their ability to obtain information outside of formal reporting 
requirements, the importance of recognition versus disclosure to various users of 
financial statements, lobbying intensity, direct and indirect costs of reporting, etc. Thus, 
ex ante, one would not expect the rules to perfectly meet the needs of any given firm or 
any given user of the financial statements.  
3. Conservative adjustments to debt covenants  
A firm and its contracting parties can accommodate demands for relatively greater 
or lesser conservatism in at least two ways. First, discretion within GAAP allows 
managers to choose financial reporting that incorporates relatively more or less 
conservatism. Second, managers and contracting parties can make adjustments to 
reported accounting numbers within individual contracts to better meet their needs. 
Adjustments to financial accounting numbers are observed in a variety of contracting 
contexts, including executive bonus plans and debt contracts. As an aside, adjustments to 
reported financial numbers are commonly made in a variety of other contexts including 
analysts’ reports, firm valuation analyses, tax accounting, etc. Even companies 
themselves make adjustments to reported accounting numbers when announcing or 
discussing their performance (e.g., “core earnings”, “pro forma earnings”, etc.)  
BWY examine the role of debt covenants in facilitating contracting between firms 
and creditors. Specifically, they examine two types of variations to net worth covenants: 
1) income escalators, and; 2) intangible asset exclusions. Net worth covenants require 
firms to maintain a certain dollar amount of net assets. Income escalators in net worth 
covenants add a percentage of positive income to the net worth threshold. For example, a 
50% cumulative income escalator would add 50% of cumulative positive net income to 
the net worth threshold. In the absence of the income escalator, the firm would be 
allowed $1 of slack in its net worth covenant for each $1 of income. With the income 
escalator, the firm is only allowed $0.50 of slack for each $1 of positive income. When 
cumulative income is negative, the net worth threshold is not typically reduced and so 
slack decreases by $1 for each $1 of negative income. This asymmetric treatment of 
positive and negative income can be considered a form of conservative adjustment in the 
net worth covenant. 
Intangible asset exclusions adjust the computation of net worth to remove 
intangible assets. Thus, a firm that chooses to use tangible assets to acquire intangible 
assets (e.g., using cash to acquire another company that is comprised mainly of intangible 
assets) would reduce the slack in their net worth threshold, and a firm that chooses to use 
equity to acquire intangible assets (e.g., using stock to buy a patent) would not increase 
slack (as would be the case if stock was used to acquire tangible assets). This treatment of 
intangible assets in the net worth covenant places externally acquired intangible assets on 
a similarly conservative footing with internally generated intangible assets. Specifically, 
the financial accounting rules for internally generated intangible assets are very 
conservative, with expenditures on such assets typically being expensed immediately as 
incurred. The intangible asset exclusion in the net worth covenant effectively treats these 
externally acquired intangible assets as also being immediately expensed.       
So how do these two types of covenants facilitate the contracting between firms 
and their creditors? Like all debt covenants, net worth covenants and the adjustments to 
these covenants must serve some role in mitigating the various agency conflicts discussed 
above between firms and their creditors. It is important to consider, however, that it is 
inefficient and costly to impose covenants that allocate decision rights to creditors too 
frequently or too infrequently. Therefore, covenants will be structured to allow slack 
when such slack is warranted and to reduce slack when concern about slack is warranted.  
Income escalators serve to reduce the amount of slack that would otherwise be 
allowed when firms generate positive income. What purpose does such an adjustment 
serve? One possibility is that creditors are sometimes concerned that a firm’s net worth at 
the inception of the debt transaction is insufficient to provide a comfortable level of 
security for its claims. Thus, the creditor imposes a constraint that net worth rise with 
income over time, which effectively constrains the firm’s payout policy by requiring that 
a certain percentage of income be reinvested. This explanation for the income escalator 
would naturally imply an asymmetric treatment for negative and positive income. When 
cumulative income is negative, the creditor will not allow the net worth threshold to drop 
because the initial net worth threshold is already lower than the creditor finds 
comfortable. In these negative income circumstances, the creditor is likely to find it 
valuable to obtain decision rights over the firm’s investment and operating decisions. 
Another possible role for the income escalators, and the one offered by BWY, is 
that “the asymmetric treatment of gains and losses afforded by the use of an income 
escalator will potentially undo the manager’s upward bias of the earnings number.” 
Under this perspective, it may be that creditors are willing to allow $1 of additional net 
worth slack for each $1 of “true” income, but that they do not trust managers to report 
truthfully, and expect that a portion of the firm’s reported income will be fabricated. 
Thus, the net worth threshold is only allowed to increase by a percentage of reported net 
income.  
Note that the net worth threshold, combined with the income escalator, should be 
able to adjust for any level of expected bias in current net worth or future income, 
regardless of the degree of conservatism in the firm’s financial reports. At the extreme 
level, the covenant can be set to prevent slack completely; that is, the net worth threshold 
can be set equal to the firm’s existing net worth at the time of the debt agreement, and the 
income escalator can be set at 100% such that the net worth threshold increases $1-for-$1 
with income over time. In light of this point, it would have been interesting for BWY to 
examine the initial tightness of the net worth threshold at the inception of the loan 
agreement. Such an analysis would likely be quite helpful in better understanding how 
income escalators resolve agency conflicts. However, the data on initial covenant 
tightness may be costly to obtain. 
The role of intangible asset exclusions in net worth covenants is likely to stem 
from a somewhat different agency conflict than that addressed by the income escalator. 
As noted above, creditors can be concerned about managers making investment decisions 
that expose the firm’s cash flows (and therefore the creditors’ claims) to greater risk. 
Intangible assets generally derive their value from future cash flows and investment 
opportunities, and can be also be quite illiquid. As such, other things equal, the cash 
flows to be generated by intangible assets are expected to be more risky than for tangible 
assets.  
The use of intangible asset exclusion provisions is likely to vary across firms 
depending on the intensity of recognized intangible assets, and the importance of 
intangible assets in the business model.4 Firms with few intangible assets on the balance 
sheet have either developed their intangible assets internally (and thus such expenditures 
are not capitalized), have acquired intangible assets but previously wrote them down, or 
simply don’t rely heavily on intangible assets as a factor of production. For such firms, 
creditors may find it comforting to exclude intangible assets from the net worth covenant 
to constrain managers’ ability to alter the firm’s asset mix by substituting away from 
tangible assets and toward intangible assets, or constrain the ability to obtain additional 
slack by acquiring intangible assets with equity or debt. In other words, creditors may 
actually prefer a greater degree of conservatism for these firms than that present in 
financial reporting rules. 
Firms with substantial intangible assets on the balance sheet have acquired 
intangible assets previously and are also likely to rely heavily on intangible assets as a 
factor of production. For these firms creditors may prefer to include intangible assets in 
the net worth covenant for two reasons. First, tangible net worth may not be a particularly 
relevant metric of financial health when a large fraction of a firm’s assets are intangibles; 
                                                 
4 Note that initial slack in a net worth covenant (regardless of whether intangible assets are excluded) can 
be set at any desired level of tightness at inception of the loan agreement. Of course, the specific dollar 
amount of the net worth threshold will need to be adjusted depending on the features of the covenant. For 
example, if the creditors and borrower desire an initial threshold that provides no slack, the initial net worth 
threshold can be set at tangible net worth in the presence of an intangible asset exclusion provision (or at 
reported net worth in the absence of an intangible asset exclusion provision). The key role of debt 
covenants, however, is to mitigate agency conflicts associated with future actions that can be taken by 
managers. Thus, even though the initial net worth threshold can be set to any tightness desired, the 
constraints on managers’ future behavior will differ depending on the specific provisions of the covenant. 
for such firms, creditors will likely want to obtain decision rights when intangible assets 
are substantially impaired. Second, creditors may have an interest in seeing the firm 
convert intangible assets to tangible assets over time; as intangible assets are amortized or 
written down over time, the firm must recoup those income effects in cash flow or other 
tangible assets to avoid losing covenant slack.       
4. Discussion of the analysis by Beatty, Weber and Yu (2008) 
BWY examine whether the prevalence of income escalators and intangible asset 
exclusions in net worth covenants is related to the degree of financial accounting 
conservatism in firms’ financial reports. In particular, they explore whether these 
conservative covenant adjustments are substitutes or complements for conservatism in 
financial statements. The substitution effect is expected if firms and creditors view 
financial statement conservatism and conservative covenant adjustments as serving a 
similar role in resolving manager-creditor agency conflicts. Analogously, a 
complementary effect is expected if firms and creditors view financial statement 
conservatism and conservative covenant adjustments as either serving different roles in 
resolving the same manager-creditor agency conflicts, or in resolving different agency 
conflicts.       
Ex ante, it seems very unlikely that conservative covenant adjustments, such as 
income escalators and intangible asset exclusions, would serve as a close substitute for 
conservative financial reporting demanded by lenders. Schipper (2005) and Guay and 
Verrecchia (2006) note that firms and lenders are expected to be able to write contracts 
that adjust for expected bias in reported financial numbers. If this is correct, covenant 
adjustments may well be a substitute for the bias role served by conservatism in financial 
reporting. However, it seems much less likely that covenant adjustments can efficiently 
serve the timely loss recognition, or informational role, of conservatism. To emphasize 
this point, note that income escalators and intangible asset exclusions provide no 
incremental information about the firm’s economic condition. Specifically, income 
escalators and intangible asset exclusions simply take known financial accounting 
numbers and make pre-determined formulaic adjustments to the net worth covenant 
threshold. However, as noted above, this does not mean that such covenant adjustments 
do not serve a valuable role in controlling agency problems between firms and lenders. 
Conservatism is only one of several reasons why income escalators and intangible asset 
exclusions might be used in debt contracts.  
At the same time, it seems quite plausible that income escalators and intangible 
asset exclusions could complement conservatism in financial reports. When creditors are 
relatively more concerned about agency conflicts with a particular borrower, a greater 
number of conservative safeguards of all kinds are expected to be observed. Equivalently, 
when creditors have little concern about agency conflicts with a particular borrower, 
there is little need/benefit for the borrower to agree to covenant restrictions or to 
implement overly conservative accounting in financial statements.     
BWY begin their analysis by identifying a sample of 2,164 private debt 
agreements with net worth covenants. The sample is partitioned into agreements that do 
and do not contain income escalators and intangible asset exclusions. The authors then 
construct measures of conservative financial reporting for the sample firms, and although 
measurement issues related to conservatism are an important part of the paper, and in this 
literature in general, I do not focus on measurement issues in my discussion.  
BWY use probit regressions to examine the relation between the existence of a 
covenant adjustment, either an income escalator or an intangible asset exclusion, and 
three underlying economic constructs: i) predicted financial statement conservatism 
explained by non-debt determinants such as litigation and tax; ii) residual financial 
statement conservatism, and; iii) agency costs of debt.  
Examining the determinants of income escalator adjustments, BWY find several 
results. First, the use of income escalators is positively associated with proxies for the 
agency costs of debt. This is comforting, but not too surprising given that, in general, all 
debt covenants are intended to resolve some form of agency conflict between firms and 
lenders. Second, the use of income escalators is negatively associated with financial 
statement conservatism explained by non-debt demands, such as litigation and tax, 
suggesting that this source of financial statement conservatism is a substitute for at least 
some of the agency conflicts that income escalators are intended to resolve. As noted 
above, because income escalators do not provide new information to creditors, if these 
covenant adjustments serve a conservatism role, it is expected to stem from their ability 
to reduce bias in reported numbers.5 Further, as noted by Guay and Verrecchia (2006), 
litigation and tax demands for conservatism likely arise from a demand for biasing 
reported financial numbers, as opposed to providing information. Thus, the notion that 
conservatism driven by litigation and tax demands could serve as a substitute for the bias-
reducing effects of income escalators is plausible.  
The use of income escalators is also found to be positively associated with 
residual financial statement conservatism unexplained by litigation and tax demands. The 
                                                 
5 Recall from the discussion above that income escalators can constructively reduce agency conflicts even 
if they do not serve a conservatism role, for example, through their ability to constrain payout policy. 
authors interpret this residual conservatism as their proxy for lenders’ demands for 
conservatism. Therefore, this result suggests that, with respect to lenders’ demands, 
financial statement conservatism is not a substitute for the agency conflicts that income 
escalators are intended to resolve. As discussed above, a key role of conservatism in 
financial reports is to provide timely information about bad news, and further, this role 
cannot be served by income escalator provisions that provide no new information. Thus, 
it seems reasonable that when lenders are more concerned about agency conflicts with 
borrowers, they will prefer both more timely information about bad news and more bias-
reducing mechanisms in the loan agreement.  
When examining the determinants of intangible asset exclusions in net worth 
covenants, BWY find no consistent, significant relations with proxies for either agency 
costs, conservatism explained by litigation and tax variables, or residual conservatism 
that serves as a proxy for lenders demands for conservatism. The first of these findings, 
that proxies for agency costs are not associated with intangible asset exclusions, may be 
the most telling result. As noted above, the primary role of all debt covenants is to control 
agency conflicts. Therefore, the fact that the authors’ proxies for the agency costs of debt 
do not adequately measure the agency conflicts being controlled by intangible asset 
exclusions suggests that more research is needed to better understand, or measure, the 
role of tangible net worth covenants. 
Note, however, that the authors’ intangible asset exclusion regressions include as 
control variables, measures of existing goodwill and intangible assets recognized on each 
firm’s balance sheet. Further, these measures are the most significant variables in the 
authors’ regressions and indicate that existing intangible assets are strongly negatively 
related to the inclusion of an intangible asset adjustment in the net worth covenant. In 
other words, lenders appear to be more concerned with excluding intangible assets from 
net worth when firms have fewer intangible assets at the inception of the loan agreement. 
This suggests that the intangible asset exclusion is a forward-looking concern on the part 
of lenders that firms with few intangible assets might decide at a future date to acquire 
greater levels of intangible assets. And, the fact that firms with substantial intangible 
assets are less likely to have intangible assets excluded suggests that these assets are 
important to consider in understanding these firms’ net worth, and/or that lenders want 
the option to have control rights in the event that these intangible assets become impaired 
(or amortized without recouping the amortization in the form of cash flows or tangible 
assets). 
5. Conclusion 
 Beatty, Weber, and Yu (2008) examine the relation between firms’ choice of 
conservatism in financial reports and their decisions to accept conservative adjustments 
to debt covenants. Although the results are mixed, the authors provide some interesting 
evidence that conservative financial reporting and conservative adjustments in debt 
covenants are used simultaneously by firms and lenders to resolve agency conflicts. The 
authors interpret their evidence that contract adjustments do not entirely replace financial 
reporting conservatism as suggesting that “the specialized needs of lenders may extend 
beyond the demands for information.” However, it seems quite plausible that the reason 
contract adjustments do not entirely replace financial reporting conservatism is because 
of lenders’ demand for information, and the fact that conservative financial reporting has 
a comparative advantage in eliciting timely information about bad news from managers.  
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